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Itwas seen in the previous chapter that coffee exports enjoy an effective
exchange rate which is about half that applicable to minor exports. But while
the thissituation suggests a roughly similar gap in the average domestic resource
costs of the two types of activity, the long-run growth prospects of coffee
ated exportshave appeared dim throughout most of the postwar period, making the
:ion, expansionof minor exports a key policy target.
ean Thetransition from heavy reliance on a low-cost staple with obvious
ians comparativeadvantage but limited growth prospects to more diversified,
costly, and dynamic export earnings has been long and difficult, as docu-
mented in Chapter 1. The discontinuity in average domestic resource costs
between coffee and minor exports reinforced export pessimism on both
demand and supply grounds. Nevertheless, it has been clear for many years
that growth of Colombia's current exchange earnings would have to be faster
than was likely to be achieved from coffee exports alone if her economy was
to attain a sustainable GDP expansion of, say, 6 per cent per year. Import
substitution, under Colombian and postwar world circumstances, was insuffi-
cient by itself to sustain such growth consistently, much less efficiently. A
more diversified and prosperous outlook for current exchange earnings was
also necessary in order to decrease reliance on concessional capital inflows,
and create for Colombia the option of tapping world private capital markets on
commercial terms.
In this chapter, I will first describe the commodity composition of minor
exports and their geographical destination and other characteristics so as to
draw up a rough typology of these very heterogeneous goods. Next, I will
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discuss policy instruments used to encourage minor exports. I will then
attempt to explain why the efforts to expand and diversify Colombian exports
have been successful, giving particular attention to the role played by effective
exchange rate policy; in doing so, I will be building on the substantial work of
others.' Ideally I would like to be able to account for the annual growth rate of
about 10 per cent per year in recorded (or registered) minor exports between
1948—50 and 1970—72, as well as for deviations around that trend. I will
explore possible differences between the economic characteristics of minor
exports to LAFTA and those to the rest of the world. Finally, I will discuss
the outlook for nontraditional exports, and take a preliminary look at their role
in achieving Colombian development targets.
AN OVER-ALL VIEW
During 1948—50, coffee represented 75 per cent of Colombia's noncontraband
merchandise exports, with crude petroleum accounting for an additional 16
per cent. As may be seen in Table 2-1, these figures were virtually unchanged
from 1957 to 1959. By 1970—72, however, minor recorded exports had reached
34 per cent of the total while the coffee share had slipped to 60 per cent. The
expansion in the dollar value of minor exports between 1957—59 and 1970—72
accounts for 84 per cent of the total increase in recorded exports between
those two dates.
A glance at Table 2-1 indicates that the expansion of recorded minor
exports has been quite irregular, particularly during the earlier years when the
base was small. Changes in world prices and variations in the contraband flow
could induce enormous percentage changes in the dollar value of recorded
minor exports. The point emerges more clearly from the following tabulation,
showing the number of years in which the year-to-year percentage changes
were registered:
Number of Years
Year-to-Year Percentage Change in Whole
Value of Recorded Minor Exports Period 1949—60 1961—72 1
Morethan 40 per cent 3 3 0
From 20 to 40 per cent 4 0 4
From 10 to 20 per cent 8 3 5 r
From 0 to 10 per cent 2 0 2 fr
From —lotoOpercent 2 1 1
re1
Less than —10per cent 5 5 0
ti
ar







































































































































































SouRcE: IMF-IFS, various issues, and IME-BOPY, various issues. Note that the latter
publication contains corrections for timing and valuation when coffee exports as shown in trade
returns are incorporated into the balance-of-payments accounts. The timing correction arises
from changes in coffee stocks held abroad by Colombian institutions. Other minor discrepancies
remain between data shown in. this table and those in later ones and in the text because of the
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TABLE 2-1
Colombian Merchandise Exports, f.o.b., 1948—72












While the diversification and larger base of minor exports during the
1960s and early 1970s yielded year-to-year changes less disparate in their total
value, a considerable spread remained. During the more recent period one
may note four major export surges, each preceded by declines or stagnation in
the export level: 1960—62; 1964—65; 1967—69; and 1971—72.
The ample opportunities which Colombian geography provides for smug- -
glinggoods into the country will be noted in Chapter 3. Overvalued exchange N
rates, export taxes, and prohibitions, as well as export quotas on some
commodities, such as coffee, and old-fashioned criminal activities, as with
emeralds, have provided the incentives for smuggling goods out of the country 1952
(nonrecorded or unregistered merchandise exports). It 'is common knowledge
that every year considerable amounts of unregistered cattle, textiles, coffee,
'I
and other goods cross the border from Colombia to Venezuela and Ecuador.
Colombian emeralds find their way to European and Japanese markets in 1957
mysterious ways. Estimates of the value of such trade are naturally gross.
Unusual external events, such as the Venezuelan boom of 1956—58, as well as
changes in domestic policies, lead to variations in the level of smuggling, but
only the rough outlines of those fluctuations have been estimated. The last 1962
column of Table 2-1 presents the most reputable of those calculations, found
in the Balance of Payments Yearbook of the IMF and covering all commodi-
i%5 ties. According to those figures, nonregistered exports reached 14 per cent of 1966
the value of registered exports from 1956 to 1960, and declined to 8 per cent 1967
during 1969—71.
Most nonregistered exports can be classified as minor, as may be seen in
1970
the last column of Table 2-2. Thus, during 1957—59 more minor exports seem 1971
to have left Colombia unrecorded than recorded. While not too much weight na
shouldbe placed on smuggling estimates, it does appear that a small part of the
2-Iforno expansionin registered minor exports observed between 1957—59 and1969—71 sourceso
tookplace at the expense of smuggling. Adding up registered and unregistered
minor exports, one obtains a growth rate of 8.6 per cent per year from 1957—
59 to 1969—71. This rate, while not as spectacular as the rate of 14.7 per cent per sugar,
year obtained for registered minor exports alone, isstill remarkable. In
particular, while the surge observed for registered minor exports during 1960— include
62 may represent to an important extent the replacement of smuggling by legal wood,
exports, post-1963 advances cannot be questioned on those grounds. The
combined series for all minor exports shows an average annual growth rate of noted
17.4per cent between 1963 and 1971.
item,
TYPESOF MINOR EXPORTS dismali
idea of
Colombian minor exports comprise a diversified group of commodities. The showir


















Colombian Minor Exports, f.o.b., 1950—71
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
Recorded Tobacco, Sugar, Cotton,


















































































































sugar, and fuel oil) accounted for less than half of registered minor exports.
During the 1960s new items were constantly added to the list, which by now
includes such varied products as gold, paper and cardboard, meat, tobacco,
wood, shoes, seafood, glass, oilseed cakes, chemicals, furs, cement, hides,
precious stones, tires, books, fresh-cut flowers, and dog toys. It should be
noted that many minor exports, including some of the largest, are hardly
"nontraditional": during the nineteenth ceiltury tobacco was a major export
item, and cotton was also exported during the U.S. Civil War. Foreign-run
plantations grew and exported bananas since early in this century, often under
dismal conditions which more than once led to bloodshed. A more precise
idea of recent minor export diversification is given by the following tabulation,
showing the number of SITC three-digit categories having the indicated export







na. = not available.
SOURCE: Basic data obtained from DANE-ADCE. various issues; also UNFAO-TY, various issues: and as in Table
2-1 for nonrecorded minor exports. DAN E-ADCE is published with a considerable lag: minor inconsistencies with the
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1960 1964 1968 1970
3 4 6 9
6 12 22 24
1 9 9 12
10 20 46 47
Both tables2-3and 2-4 also show thediversificationof minor exports, the
former from 1957 through 1970, and the latter in greater detail for 1970. A look
at these tables suggests that various minor exports are likely to have different
domestic supply price elasticities as well as different input requirements. As
indicated in tables 2-2 and 2-4, the destination of minor exports, as between
LAFTA and non-LAFTA countries, fluctuates sharply from item to item.
Foreign demand income elasticities will also vary as between, say, textiles and
meat.
Somewhat loose but convenient and complementary classification
schemes are used in tables 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4, and can be summarized as
follows:













More than $5 mill.
Between $1 mill, and $5 mill.
Between $0.5 mill, and $1 mill.










Four important primary products, which made up half of minor exports
during the late 1950s, still accounted for nearly 40 per cent of those exports in
1968—70. In spite of their primary-product label, their dollar value grew at an
impressive annual rate. Since both manufactured goods and the miscella-
neous category are far from homogenous in their economic characteristics,
regardless of what classification is followed, a closer look at each of the three
subgroups is in order.
Bananas, Cotton, Sugar, and Tobacco (BCST).
It is sometimes asserted that before a developing country can expand its



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SITC Number and Category U.S. DollarsLAFTA
001- Liveanimals $17.41 90.0%
011 Fresh meat 4.72 5.3
031 Fresh fish 4.83 0
051 Fresh fruits and nuts (mainly bananas) 18.21 0.5
061 Sugar and honey 14.78 0
081 Animal products 6.25 34.8
(0-other)Other food and live animals 4.23 55.8
121 Tobacco, unmanufactured 7.17 0.3
(1-other)Other beverages and tobacco 0.05 6.1
263 Cotton 34.55 5.1
266 Synthetic fibers 3.75 92.8
(2-other)Other crude materials, inedible, excluding fuels 8.53 6.7
(3-other)Other mineral fuels, lubricants, etc., excluding crude
petroleum 14.58 12.7
4 Animal and vegetable oils and fats 0.04 0
513 Inorganic chemical products 2.43 61.4 t
514 Other inorganic chemicals 0.60 93.9
541 Medical and pharmaceutical products 2.68 75.8
581 Plastics, cellulose, resins 1.02 69.5
(5-other)Other chemicals 1.96 44.8
61 Leather, skins, and their manufactures 5.67 2.9
62 Rubber manufactures. n.e.s. 1.29 82.6
63 Wood and cork manufactures 1.95 0.8
64 Paper and manufactured paper products 1.37 56.3
651 Threads and spun fibers 4.18 8.3
652 Cotton textiles 7.51 8.6
(65-other)Other textile yarn and fabrics 1.02 24.5
661 Cement and construction materials 3.55 40.8
665 Manufactures of glass 3.16 13.1
667 Pearls and precious stones 3.55 0.5
(66-other)Other nonmetallic and mineral manufactures, n.e.s. 1.49 29.6
67 Iron and steel 0.42 72.0
68 Nonferrous metals 4.42 3.8
69 Manufactures of metals, n.e.s. 2.58 55.5
7 Machinery and transport equipment 5.58 58.9
841 Clothing 1.10 11.2
851 Shoes 0.74 0.3
892 Printing 2.23 58.5
(8-other)Other miscellaneous manufactured articles 2.20 45.8
9 Commodities and transactions, n.e.s. 8.37 0.1
Total 210.14 22.4






SITC Number and Category U.S. DollarsLAFTA
Summary of main groups
Fruits, sugar, tobacco, cotton 74.71 2.5
Manufactured goods (3-other, 5,6, 7,and 8) 77.26 26.8
Miscellaneous minor 58.18 42.1
Souxca: DANE-ADCE(1970).
processof import-substituting industrialization. Clearly, industrialization was
not a precondition for expanding Colombian BCST exports from annual levels
of $11 million during 1950—52 to $21 million during 1957—59 and $75 million
during 1968—70. The expansion of BCST exports between the last two dates
accounted for 35 per cent of the total increase in registered minor exports.
Cotton alone was responsible for 21 per cent of that expansion, with sugar
providing another 10 per cent. Import substitution in bananas, sugar, or
tobacco was not a preliminary step to exporting; for cotton, however, the
postwar story is different, as will be seen below.
Comparative advantage for these four commodities is rooted in the
availability of Colombian natural resources, working within a certain range of
labor and transport costs. By themselves, of course, these factors do not
explain the level of BCST exports actually achieved during the postwar period
nor their growth rate.
The relatively standardized nature of the items in the BCST group makes
it possible to develop not only dollar-value time series but also both export
quantity and unit-value series. These figures, presented in Table 2-5,show
that the rapid growth in the dollar value of BCST exports between 1957—59
and 1968—70 was based on an expansion in their physical volume (averaging
15.5percent per year), with unit dollar prices declining between those two
dates. It can also be seen that during the same interval, domestic output of
these crops grew at a significantly lower rate than the quantity of exports (8.3
per cent vs. 15.5 per cent).
The behavior of the BCST export unit value series is interesting. One may
note, first of all, its instability, which for 1957—70 has been about as great as
that for coffee, although the BCST index comprises four different commodi-
ties. The average year-to-year change in coffee prices, disregarding signs, was
8.8 per cent; in the BCST unit value index, it was 8.7 per cent. During the
difficult years of 1958 and 1959 both coffee and BCST prices plunged, and the
crisis in the second half of 1966 was aggravated by the simultaneous deteriora-
.ts
It
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TABLE 2-5
Value, Quantity, Price, and Production Indices for Bananas, Cotton,
Sugar, and Tobacco (BCST), 1950—70





Value Quantity Value Production
1950 26.6 n.a. n.a. 35.7
1951 27.1 n.a. n.a. 38.4
1952 27.4 n.a. na. 39.5
1953 35.4 n.a. n.a. 51.5
1954 39.4 n.a. na. 59.7
1955 47.7 n.a. n.a. 60.2
1956 79.6 n.a. n.a. 61.6
1957 73.7 40.8 180.6 54.7
1958 43.9 37.0 118.8 57.8
1959 39.9 42.8 93.3 81.7
1960 72.3 75.0 96.5 87.4
1961 85.2 90.6 94.1 90.8
[962 91.1 88.2 103.2 90.4
1963 88.8 83.3 106.6 91.4
1964 79.1 73.7 107.3 84.7
1965 104.7 101.4 103.3 95.3
1966 92.9 109.7 84.6 115.8
1967 145.2 161.2 90.1 132.9
1968 185.1 202.6 91.3 160.2
1969 189.9 193.8 98.0 156.9
1970 187.7 193.8 96.8 147.3
na. =notavailable.
SOURCE: Export quantity and value data for each of the commodities
obtained from DANE-ADCE, various issues. Domestic output for each of the
commodities obtained from the national accounts. The composite index for
the whole group was obtained by using the following weights, based on the
percentage share of each of the commodities in their total export value (in
dollars) during 1957—69: bananas (fruit), 44.04; cotton, 27.40; sugar, 16.02; and
tobacco, 12.54. The same weights were used to obtain the export and domestic
production quantity indices. The export unit-value index was obtained using
the export value and quantity indices. The method of calculating the export
quantities does not take account of possible quality changes in the four
products. The banana index includes a small quantity of other fruits.TYPES OF MINOR EXPORTS 43
Notes to Table 2-S(concluded)
Itshould be noted that the contributions of each of the four crops to the
increaseinBCST exports between 1957—59and1967—69 were quite different
from their participation in total exports during 1957—69.Theirpercentage
contributions to that increment were as follows: bananas (fruit), 9.8; cotton,
53.0; sugar, 30.6; and tobacco, 6.6.
tion of coffee and BCST prices, the former slight and the latter severe. On the
whole, however, and fortunately for Colombia, the correlation between
changes in dollar coffee prices and those in the BCST export unit value index
is far from perfect (R =+0.43) through 1970. It may be too much to expect
that diversification will take place into commodities whose prices are nega-
tively correlated. Colombia has at least moved into other primary products
which do not systematically follow the gyrations of coffee markets.
For BCST, exports represent an important outlet for domestic produc-
tion; yet they account for a very small share in total world BCST exports. The
following tabulation shows these relations in about
Exports as Per Cent
of
Domestic Colombian Exports as






Theshare of production exported every year has fluctuated considerably,
particularly for cotton and sugar. As supplying the local market receives first
priority, exports bear the brunt of poor crops (which have triggered export
prohibitions in some cases) and become the key outlet for bountiful ones. In
the case of bananas output has been particularly vulnerable to pests and
hurricanes, but the other three crops also show fluctuations associated with
primary production.
The small shares which Colombian BCST exports have in world markets
do not necessarily imply very high price elasticities in the foreign demand for
these goods. For one thing, bananas, cotton, sugar, and tobacco are hardly
homogeneous products in world markets. Colombian tobacco is far from a
perfect substitute for the Cuban leaf, for example. Secondly, "the world
market" is a fragmented one, and exports to country A may not be substituted




1948—52 8 17 0 25
1953—55 25 8 0 33
1958—59 50 9 0 59
1960—61 73 1 20 54
1962—65 71 4 18 57
1966—69 109 2 35 76
SOURCE: UNFAO-PY and UNFAO-TY, various issues. Data for 1956—57 not available.
sugar market, in which Colombia was subjected to export quotas imposed by
the United States as well as by the International Sugar Agreement and also
encountered discriminatory barriers in European and other countries.It
should also be noted that the Colombian market shares, though small, have
been tending to grow, and that part of such expansion was due to unique
events (the embargo against Cuba, for example). Nevertheless, while foreign
demand for BCST may not be perfectly price-elastic, the small Colombian
market shares do provide support for the view that during the period under
study foreign demand for Colombian exports has been rather price-elastic and
that at least for the next few years, given the likely increases in Colombian
output, there islittle ground for "elasticity pessimism" regarding BCST
exports. In circumstances under which a given commodity bumps one year
against foreign-imposed (demand) quotas and the next year is subject to
export prohibitions and supply quotas, it is difficult to be more precise about
the shape of the idealized foreign demand schedule.
One may add that almost the whole of BCST exports are to countries
outside the LAFTA preferential trading bloc, as shown in Table 2-2, in sharp
contrast to the other registered minor exports. Therefore, the foreign
exchange they earn is in an important sense more valuable than that earned
from exports to LAFTA, under the reasonable assumptions that "reciproc-
ity" will be more narrowly enforced with LAFTA, and that such commerce
will involve some trade diversion.
Another characteristic of the BCST group is that, besides being subject to
influences emanating from foreign trade policy, it has benefited from special
agricultural policies, which regulate its internal prices and provide subsidized
credit. The case of cotton is perhaps the most dramatic example of the payoff
to such ad hoc, crop-specific programs. As shown in Table 2-6, during the
postwar years Colombia passed from being a net importer to a net exporter of
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TABLE 2-6
Cotton in Postwar Colombia, 1948—52 to 1966—69
(annual averages in thousands of metric tons)
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that commodity within a short period of time. During the 1950s cotton growers
(mainly large-scale growers, it may be noted) received generous tax conces-
sions as well as credit and price support from an institute designed exclusively
= topromote that crop. Such policies have continued, raising not only output
but also yields. (While Colombia became an important cotton exporter during
the 1960s, competing exports from some traditional sources, such as Mexico,
stagnated.) Sugar and bananas have also benefited greatly from special gov-
ernment credit programs.
The production of BCST crops is overwhelmingly in Colombian hands.
Foreign ownership in the production of bananas existed until a few years ago;
now foreign participation is limited to marketing. In cotton, sugar, and
tobacco both production and marketing, as in the case of coffee, are largely
Colombian. The expansion of BCST exports, therefore, can hardly be cred-
ited to any special foreign presence in the production or sale of these commod-
ities.
The BCST crops are grown at several points well spread out within the
It country: sugar comes mainly from the Cauca Valley and bananas from the
e Gulf of Urabá, while cotton is increasingly grown on the Atlantic coast.
Manufactured Exports.
n
•Colombian manufactured exports have gone from an annual average of
d $10 million during 1957—59 to $80 million during 1968—70. That expansion
accounted for 43 per cent of the total growth in registered minor exports
between these dates. By 1968 the share of all Colombian exports in SITC
r categories 5, 6, 7, and 8 was larger than the corresponding figure for New
) Zealand.
t As shown in Table 2-4, it would be a mistake to assume that all these
exports are made up of labor-intensive commodities: the list includes not only
s cotton textiles, shoes, and near handicrafts, but also fuel oil, chemicals, and
cement. As will be seen below, some aspects of Colombian export promotion
policy may in fact encourage the latter type more than the former. The variety
and heterogeneity of manufactured exports highlighted in Table 2-4 also helps
- explainthe difficulty of obtaining export quantity and unit value indices, as
was done in the case of BCST. For the years shown, characterized by a
relatively stable world dollar price level, such a lack of quantity indices does
) not represent a serious problem. For more recent years, for which disaggre-
gated data are not yet available, the problem seems more severe, and it is to be
hoped that Colombian statistical authorities will develop quantity and price
f indices for the chief types of minor exports.
A rough analytical classification of all manufactured exports could be as
I follows:
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1. Those which involve some slight processing of primary products. These
are mostly included under SITC categories 0, 1, and 2; so they are excluded
from our definition of manufactures. Examples are refined sugar and
oilseed cakes.
2. Capital-intensive commodities, sold sporadically in competitive world mar-
kets. These are exports designed to use up planned or unplanned excess
capacity. They are sold at marginal cost ("dumped") by plants whose
output is, over the long run, expected to go mainly (say, 95percent and
above) to the local market. Examples are exports of some chemicals,
cement, glass, and petroleum products.
3. Capital-intensive commodities, whose plants have been designed to sell a
good share of their output (say 5to30 per cent) within the LAFTA area,
taking advantage of tariff preferences. This category is expected to gain in
importance. Examples are petrochemicals and automobile parts.
4. Labor-intensive commodities, or parts of final products, sold at world.
prices.
This classification, of course, could be further refined, especially with the
help of product-cycld concepts. Sporadic dumping of capital-intensive exports
within LAFTA as well as in world markets can occur, as reported for some
petrochemical exports to Mexico. Labor-intensive commodities may be sold
from plants totally or partially devoted to the export market (the former are
still rare). Neither the line between "labor-intensive" and other goods or
processes nor that between manufactures and primary products is a sharp
one. To give one example combining both ambiguities: about half the value
of exports of cotton textiles ("manufactures") is made up of raw cotton
("primary product"), and it is not clear whether cotton spinning and weaving
are more or less labor-intensive than the growing of cotton. Finally, some
exports of manufactures are close complements of primary-product exports;
for example, cardboard exported as banana boxes. Others, although capital-
intensive, may exploit locational advantages, for example, cement exports
from the Colombian Atlantic coast. It is not possible, at this stage, to classify
Colombian manufactured exports according to the categories outlined above.
But the discussion at least should alert us to the possibility of spontaneous or
policy-induced "Leontief paradoxes."
Colombian manufactured exports represent a small fraction of both
domestic manufactured production and world trade in manufactured goods.
With few exceptions, local plants seldom have planned to export, as a regular
business, more than 10 per cent of their output. Some enterprises are cau-
tiously moving into higher ranges (textiles, for example), and there are a
handful of small plants which ship 100 per cent of their production abroad
(e.g., some leather-processing near handicrafts and clothing plants located inTYPES OF MINOR EXPORTS 47
the Barranquila bonded free-trade facilities). There are few manufactures for
which Colombian exports have more than a tiny fraction of world trade.
Nevertheless, in textiles Colombia faces U.S. and European import quotas,
and in cement Colombian exports have some influence within the Caribbean
and Gulf of Mexico markets. On the whole, it appears that Colombia has just
is begun to tap foreign market possibilities for her manufactures, both inside and
outside the LAFTA region. Elasticity pessimism seems even less justified for
manufactures than for BCST exports.
As shown in Table 2-4, LAFTA members take the larger share of
Colombian exports such as synthetic fibers, rubber tires, pharmaceuticals,
a machinery and transport equipment, and plastics, which appear to be capital-
a or import-intensive, or both (the reason for the latter will be seen below). On
the other hand, cotton textiles and leather and wood manufactures are prima-
rily sold to the rest of the world. In a later section of this chapter, I will further
explore systematic differences between LAFTA and non-LAFTA exports.
* Whilethe exact degree of direct foreign investment in Colombian manu-
factured exports is not known, the sample data presented in Chapter 6 indicate
te that during 1970 companies that were at least 50 per cent foreign owned
ts represented no less than 27 per cent of all Colombian manufactured exports. It
is doubtful whether the exact percentage went above 35.TwoColombian-
:
.d owned corporations (COLTEJER and FABRICATO) dominate textile
exports, and it appears that most firms exporting leather products and clothing
are also Colombian owned. Foreign participation looms larger in chemicals,
P glass, rubber tires, and paper. As of 1972, foreign-owned assembly-type
IC operations hooked into multinational businesses ("export platforms") were
rare, and their exports from bonded free-trade zones were also modest. On the
whole, the expansion of Colombian manufactured exports appears to owe
little so far to the specific talents of export-oriented foreign investors.
As in the case of BCST crops, manufactured exports come from several
points within Colombia. The geographical advantages of the Atlantic coast
:S cities of Cartagena and Barranquilla, however, may make them dominant
exporting centers if exporting continues to grow in importance in the planning
of new industrial plants.
:h Miscellaneous Minor Exports.
-ir Besides manufactured and BCST exports there is a residual category
made up mainly of primary products. It contains some items, such as flowers,
a live animals, meat, and lumber, that have remarkable growth potential
*.d because of a combination of favorable world markets and a fairly elastic
in domestic supply. In some cases, as with meat and cattle on the hoof, border48 MINOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
trade (or nonrecorded exports) has been important for many years. The
diversified Colombian geography seems capable of generating a generous
supply of a wide variety of these miscellaneous exports, from live tropical fish
to less exotic beans and shrimp, for which the Colombian share in world
markets remains small. Comparing 1957—59 with 1968—70, the miscellaneous
category accounts for 22 per cent of the increase in all minor exports. This
type of export appearsbe mostly Colombian owned, but other generaliza-
tions are difficult. Flowers, for example, are quite labor-intensive, but beef
cattle require much land and relatively little labor.
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CUSTOMERS
FOR COLOMBIAN EXPORTS
Besides the appearance of LAFTA and of its subregion, the Andean Common
Market, there have been other significant changes during the l960s and early
l970s in the importance of the different customers for Colombian exports. The
United States share in all recorded Colombian exports dropped from 70 per
cent during 1957—58 to 40 per cent during 1967—69 and to 35 per cent during
1970—72. That for the (unenlarged) European Common Market rose from 13 to
24 per cent between 1957—58 and 1967—69, and then dipped to 22 per cent
during 1970—72. The absolute average annual dollar value of Colombian
exports to the United States, in fact, declined by. a remarkable one-third
between 1957—58 and 1967—69. The LAFTA share in all recorded exports, in
spite of sharp increases from 1 per cent to 7 per cent and then to 9 per cent,
remained modest. By 1970—72 the Andean group alone accounted for 7 per
cent of all Colombian exports.
The increased geographical diversification of Colombian exports has not
come about only as a result of greater product diversification. It may be seen
in Table 2-7 that a marked diversification in markets for coffee occurred
between 1957—58 and 1967—69, with the United States losing almost half of its
still dominant share. A similar trend has been registered for BCST exports,
with the European Common Market losing a large chunk of its leading share.
In spite of large increases in their absolute level, the geographical spread in
non-BCST minor exports changed surprisingly little between the two periods
shown. Both the U.S. and LAFTA shares rose, but not by much. European
and Japanese markets for these nontraditional exports have remained on the
whole flabby relative to the purchases of more traditional primary products
(coffee and BCS1').
These trends emerge more clearly in Table 2-8, which focuses on geo-
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TABLE 2-8
Geographical Distribution of the Increment in the Average Annual Dollar Value of
Colombian Exports Between 1957—58 and 1967—69











United States —155.4 31.0 21.6 36.3
Canada 1.8 2.7 0.9 3.7
United Kingdom 15.9 7.5 23.4 —1.6
Japan 11.7 3.4 5.8 2.0
European Common Market 96.9 16.0 27.5 9.4
Other industrial Western
European 19.3. 2.9 —0.1 4.6
Other nonsocialist European 49.2 3.6 7.7 1.3
Andean Common Market 27.5 12.5 4.0 17.4
Other LAFTA 16.4 .7.1 2.2 10.0
Central American Common
Market 4.1 2.4 —0.1 3.8
Other Western Hemisphere —17.4 7.6 1.1 11.4
Socialist 27.7 1.8 4.7 0.2
Others 2.4 1.5. 1.4 1.6
BCST =bananas,coffee, sugar, and tobacco.
SOURCE:Basicdata as in Table 2-7.
1967—69. Besides the changes already noted for all exports, the growing
importance of the markets in "Other nonsocialist Europe" (with Spain as the
key country) and in socialist countries is worth noting. In both cases the major
export was coffee, sold under bilateral arrangements that were steadily but
mildly criticized by the IMF and others. These arrangements together with the
LAFTA and Andean pacts were the major Colombian departures from multi-
lateral rules of the game for trade. The bilateral pacts, of course, limited.the
convertibility of export proceeds. By 1971 bilateral payments agreements had
dwindled to those with the Democratic Republic of Germany, Hungary,
Poland, Spain, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. In 1958 there had been
bilateral agreements also with Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, and
Czechoslovakia.
The concentration of the expansion of non-BCST minor exports within
the Americas emerges clearly from Table 2-8. The share of that increase going
to the sheltered LAFTA zone was 27 per cent. The Caribbean and Central
American areas, where Colombia has to meet competition from the rest of the
world without the shelter of preferential treatment, accounted for an addi-
tional 15 per cent. The United States and Canada picked up another 40 perPOLICY VARIABLES INFLUENCING MINOR EXPORTS 51
cent of the increase in non-BCST minor exports, leaving only about 17 per
cent of the increment for the rest of the world. In contrast with this pattern,
the Americas absorbed only 30 per cent of the expansion of BCST exports.
POLICY VARIABLES INFLUENCING MINOR
EXPORTS
We can now turn to an examination of the most important variables manipu-
lated by Colombian authorities in their search for larger minor exports. They
include the exchange rate, export subsidies and taxes, drawbacks on import
taxes, membership in preferential trade agreements, subsidized credits, and
other subsidized facilities.
The Effective Exchange Rate.
Before the reforms of March 1967, "the effective exchange rate applied to
minor exports" was often a blurry concept, subject to frequent changes. A
quantification attempt, which becomes more robust as more recent years are
approached, is presented in Table 2-9. It involves, first, the nominal exchange
- rategiven for most merchandise exports except coffee and petroleum. Fre-
quently during the 1950s and early 1960s this rate was not applicable to
exports of gold, bananas, raw hides, precious stones, and a few other goods,
or to manufactured exports having more than a given percentage of imported
g inputs. The rate was allowed to float freely during some periods, as during
e 1959, when it coincided with the free rate applicable to most capital account
transactions. At other times, it was pegged at a level different from that
it applicable to coffee and imports, as during 1963. Since June 1968 it has
e corresponded to the basic certificate exchange rate, which with minor excep-
- tions,such as petroleum, applies to nearly all current and capital account
transactions.
:1 The more notable features of the fiscal system as it affects new exporters
are summarized in the second column of Table 2-9. The emergency measures
taken after the overthrow of General Rojas Pinila in 1957 included export
i taxes: 15 per cent during the third quarter of 1957 and 2 per cent subsequently
through the first quarter of 1961 for most minor exports. These taxes were
•n justified as part of the austerity package aimed at working off short-term
g foreign debts accumulated under the previous government.
ii Starting effectively in June 1961, it was assumed on the basis of Law 81 of
e December 22, 1960, that export profits were as much as 40 per cent of gross
exports, and presumed export profits were allowed to be excluded from
taxable profits. Not included in the benefits of this law, besides coffee and
1
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TABLE 2-9
Exchange Rate Applied toMost RegisteredMinor Colombian Exports, 1949—72
PPP-EER
Wholesale Applied
Basic Subsidies Price Index: to Most
Rate Via Tax Colombian Minor
(pesos System Deflated Exports
per U.S. (per by U.S. (1963
dot.) centa) (1963 =100) prices)
(.
1949 3.02 — 34.9 8.65
1950 3.12 — 38.0 8.20
1951 2.53 — 36.7 6.89
1952 2.92 — 37.1 7.86
1953I 3.55 — 38.7 9.17
II 3.41 — 39.8 8.57
III 3.48 — 40.9 8.52
IV 3.43 — 40.9 8.39
1954I 3.53 — 41.9 8.42
11 3.46 — 43.6 7.93
III 3.45 — 43.0 8.02
IV 3.50 — 41.9 8.35
19551 3.50 — 43.0 8.14
II 3.85 — 43.0 8.95
III 4.05 — 43.6 9.29
IV 4.04 — 43.6 9.26
19561 4.28 — 44.7 9.58
II 4.67 — 45.8 10.19
III 4.82 — 46.9 10.28
IV 6.05 — 48.5 12.49
19571 6.34 — 49.0 12.94
II 6.23 — 54.1 11.52
111 4.95 —15 57.6 7.31
IV 5.23 —2 58.6 8.76
1958I 5.92 —2 60.0 9.67
II 6.10 —2 63.0 9.49
111 6.10 —2 64.0 9.34
IV 6.10 —2 66.0 9.06
1959I 7.42 —2 66.3 10.96
II 8.00 —2 69.3 11.31
III 7.74 —2 70.3 10.80
LV 6.93 —2 71.0 9.56
19601 6.81 —2 71.0 9.39
II 6.82 —2 72.0 9.28




Basic Subsidies Price Index: to Most
Rate •Via Tax Colombian Minor
(pesos System Deflated Exports
per U.S. (per by U.S. (1963
dol.) (1963 =100) prices)
IV 7.12 —2 73.0 9.56
1961 I 7.55 —2 74.3 9.97
II 8.23 — 78.0 10.55
III 8.63 14 78.0 12.62
IV 8.77 14 78.0 12.82
1962 I 8.80 14 78.0 12.86
II 8.91 14 79.0 12.86
III 8.61 14 79.0 12.43
IV 10.22 14 80.0 14.56
1963 1 10.09 14 90.0 12.78
II 9.99 14 101.0 11.28
III 9.99 14 103.0 11.06
IV 9.99 14 107.0 10.64
1964 I 9.99 14 112.0 10.17
11 9.98 14 119.0 9.56
III 9.98 14 119.0 9.56
IV 11.74 14 119.0 11.24
1965 I 13.57 14 118.8 13.02
II 16.63 14 122.6 15.47
III 13.50 14 124.3 12.38
IV 13.50 14 132.0 11.66
1966 I 13.50 14 136.2 11.30
II 13.50 14 142.9 10.77
III 13.50 14 142.5 10.80
IV 13.50 14 145.3 10.59
1967 I 13.50 14 147.5 10.43
II 14.02 18 150.1 11.02
III 14.86 18 151.7 11.56
IV 15.54 18 153.5 11.95
1968 1 15.84 18 153.8 12.15
II 16.14 18 157.3 12.11
III 16.39 18 157.0 12.32
IV 16.73 18 156.7 12.60
1969 1 16.96 18 157.1 12.74
II 17.19 18 160.0 12.68
11.1 17.45 18 160.9 12.80




Basic Subsidies Price Index: to Most
Rate Via Tax Colombian Minor
(pesos System Deflated Exports
per U.S. (per by U.S. (1963
dol.) centa) (1963 =100) prices)
IV 17.69 18 163.7 12.75
19701 18.00 18 162.8 13.04
II 18.30 18 167.1 12.92
III 18.56 18 166.7 13.14
IV 18.92 19 169.3 13.30
19711 19.29 19 171.7 13.37
II 19.69 19 175.7 13.34
III 20.14 19 178.5 13.43
IV 20.64 19 182.8 13.44
1972I 21.16 20 183.8 13.81
II 21.66 20 188.7 13.78
III 22.10 20 192.4 13.78
IV 22.54 20 198.1 13.66
SOURCE: Basic rates applied to most minor exports were obtained from IMF-IFS and
IMF-AROER, various issues. It should be noted that, especially during the l950s, minor
exports were seldom treated as a homogeneous category. Export taxes (see note a, below)
were also obtained from IMF-AROER.
Subsidies via the tax system are estimates of the average impact of an allowance for
income tax deductions for exporters, effective from the third quarter of 1961 through the
first quarter of 1967, plus the tax-exempt CAT granted to minor exporters from the second
quarter of 1967 through 1972. Both subsidies affected companies differently depending on
their particular tax situation and bracket; an average tax rate of 30—35 per cent can be
assumed in computing the net subsidy. On the other hand, the CAT is a negotiable
instrument which when first introduced could be used in lieu of cash to pay taxes up to one
year from issue. The redemption date was reduced to nine months in October 1970. Late in
1971, the redemption date for CATs was further reduced from nine to three months for
manufactured products and from nine to six months for all other eligible exports. Thus, the
exact present value of CATs has fluctuated with these changes in redemption dates as well
as with fluctuations in interest rates. Discounts of 18—20 per cent can be assumed.
Depending on their own specific circumstances, companies could choose to hold or sell
their CATs. The net subsidy shown in the table, therefore, represents a rough average.
Wholesale prices for Colombia and the United States obtained from IMF-IFS.
a. Minus sign signifies export tax.POLICY VARIABLES INFLUENCING MINOR EXPORTS 55
petroleum,were bananas, precious metals, and hides. if a marginal income tax
of around 35percent is assumed for exporting corporations, the average
(taxable-equivalent) subsidy amounts to about 14 per cent. Note that the
bigger the corporation and, presumably, the higher its marginal tax rate, the
larger the subsidy. Firms making little or no profit could not benefit from this
measure.
Articles 166 through 171 of Law 444 of March 22,1967,replaced the fiscal
incentive of Law 81 with the neater device of tax certificates given to
exporters of goods other than coffee, petroleum and its by-products, and raw
cattle hides. These certificates (CATs) amounted to 15 per cent of the f.o.b.
value of exports and could be used to pay income, sales, and import taxes.
Originally, they could not be used for these purposes at face value until one
year after they were issued, but the owner could sell them freely to others, at
the discount indicated by short-term interest rates. Redemption dates for
CATs were lowered in 1970 and 1971. CATs were tax exempt. While under
previous tax exemption an exporter had to have a given level of profits from
other activities before he could benefit from the system, CATs can be readily
converted into cash by any exporter, regardless of his tax status. On balance,
the tax-exempt status of CATs more than offsets their discount, yielding an
average taxable-equivalent subsidy of around 18 to 20 per cent.4
Once account is taken of differential price trends in Colombia vis-à-vis
the rest of the world, the purchasing-power-parity-adjusted effective exchange
rate (PPP-EER) applied to most minor exports can be estimated. The calcula-
tions shown in Table 2-9 simply compare Colombian and U.S. wholesale
prices, a method which, although rough, provides a fairly accurate picture of
the major trends in the real effective exchange rate for the period shown.
Given the growing Colombian trade diversification and the post-1971 interna-
tional monetary order, future calculations of this sort should take into account
Colombian exchange rates and differential price movements vis-à-vis several
of her major trade partners.5
Five features of the computed PPP-EER for minor exports may be briefly
considered: average annual levels, year-to-year changes, a more refined insta-
bility index, and its differences compared with both the PPP nominal import
rate and the PPP-EER for coffee. It may be seen in the first column of Table 2-
10 that recent net exchange rates for minor exports exceed those dominant
during the 1950s. The upward trend, however, was far from steady until recent
years, as can be seen in the second and third columns. The instability measure
presented in the latter column uses the average of the absolute value of
quarter-to-quarter percentage changes for the four consecutive quarters of a
given year. Thus, this column shows that during 1954 the quarter-to-quarter
changes in the exchange rate, whether positive or negative, averaged 2.9 per56 MINOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
cent, while during 1957 that average rose to a remarkable 17.7 per cent.
Besides 1957, other particularly unstable years were 1959 and 1965. One of the
key advantages of the crawling peg emerges clearly from this index after 1967.
The fourth column of Table 2-10 presents ratios of the annual minor
export rate to the average nominal merchandise import rate, also expressed in
1963 prices. The latter excludes the incidence of duties, controls, and prior





























PPP-EER for Minor Exports
Ratio to Aver. Ratio to
per U.S. Changes InstabilityPPP Nominal Rate Coffee
dol.) (per cent)(per cent) for Imports PPP-EER
1953 8.66 10.2 .n.a. 1.39 1.74
1954 8.18 —5.5 2.86 1.39 1.73
1955 8.91 8.9 4.15 1.54 1.80
1956 10.64 19.4 8.05 1.97 1.99
1957 10.13 —4.8 17.74 1.41 1.68
1958 9.39 —7.3 4.21 0.84 1.53
1959 10.66 13.5 10.04 1.08 1.97
1960 9.41 —11.7 1.49 1.03 1.62
1961 11.49 22.1 7.83 1.32 1.86
1962 13.18 14.7 5.20 1.52 2.02
1963 11.44 —13.2 7.43 1.27 1.84
1964 10.13 —11.5 7.00 1.32 1.84
1965 13.13 29.6 15.10 1.66 2.52
1966 10.87 —17.2 2.50 1.19 2.20
1967 11.24 3.4 3.31 1.20 2.12
1968 12.30 9.4 1.50 1.19 2.10
1969 12.74 3.6 0.73 1.19 2.13
1970 13.10 2.8 1.53 1.19 2.17
1971 13.40 2.3 0.38 1.18 2.15
1972 13.76 2.7 0.98 1.19 2.29
n.a. =notavailable.
SOURCE:Basicdata obtained from the last column of Table 2-9 and from the sources listed
there. See text for explanation of the third column. The purchasing-power-parity average
nominal import exchange rate is taken from Table 4-8. The effective purchasing-power-parity
coffee exchange rate was obtained as for Table 1-3.
I
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parity exchange rate, and as such conceptually different from the more
complicated effective rate for minor exports to which it is compared. For
example, the gap shown for 1968—72 arises mainly from the inclusion of the
effective value of the CAT in the export rate. Nevertheless, the data in the
fourth column highlight one striking fact: in the years following exchange
reform in Colombia, such as 1958, 1963, and 1966, (a) increases occurred in the
purchasing-power-parity nominal import rate and (b) declines occurred in the
effective rate applied to minor exports; there was, therefore, (c) a tendency
toward unification of those two rates. In other words, the goal of exchange
rate unification was pursued at the expense of incentives for minor exports.
With the exception of the peculiar circumstances of 1958, however, the
effective minor export rate remained above the nominal rate for imports.
Finally, the last column of Table 2-10 shows the politically sensitive and
economically revealing gap between the effective rate for minor exports and
that for coffee. Since 1966, this gap has remained quite steady, with the coffee
rate running at about half the minor export rate in spite of variations in the
dollar coffee price. The relative stickiness of this relationship has turned the
politically powerful coffee growers into champions of the crawling peg.
The Vallejo Plan.
Since around 1956. and at first motivated by a desire to use excess
industrial capacity, the import content of certain exports, mainly manufac-
tured goods, has been exempted (ex ante) from import duties, prior deposits,
consular fees, and the need to obtain prior import licenses, subject to some
stringent conditions. These now include the signing of an ad hoc contract with
the government, clearly specifying the export goods; submission of proof that
the imports are being financed according to Law 444;adeposit with customs
of a guarantee (from a bank or an insurance company) amounting to twice the
corresponding import duties; a guarantee that those imports which have not
been used and are on the prohibited list will be re-exported; and a commitment
• to carry a special set of accounting books for these contracts. Not surpris-
ingly, the major (but not exclusive) users of this "Plan Vallejo," as it has been
known in Colombia since 1959, have been large manufacturing firms. More
general drawback (ex post) systems are also allowed in principle by Law 444
andits predecessors but have not been implemented in practice, with the
exception of the "Plan Vallejo Jr." or reposition provision, which since 1964
• has allowed exporters who had used imported inputs and paid duties on them to
import the same quantity and quality of merchandise free of duties, prior
deposits, and the requirement of obtaining a prior license.
It may be seen in Table 2-li that a vigorous implementation of the Vallejo
Plan started in about 1962, after the system was reformed in 1959. From 196758 MINOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
TABLE 2-11
Exports and Imports Under the Vallejo Plan, 1960—71




Imports as Per Cent
of Exports
1960 0.10 0.06
1961 0.20 0.18 43
1962 0.17 0.84
1963 2.22 5.80 38
1964 5.08 12.87 39
1965 9.83 26.19 38
1966 12.06 41.69 29
1967 16.97 40.79 42
1968 17.86 51.95 34
1969 13.65 62.80 22
1970 24.70 58.10 43
1971 26.00 64.90 40
SOURCE: INCOMEX,"Análisis Sobre el Desarrollo de los Sistemas
Especialesdelmportacion-Exportacidn,"mimeographed(Bogota:
Banco de IaRepüblica, 1971). Importsincludeboth raw materials and
machinery.
through 1970, Vallejo Plan exports have accounted for about 30 per cent of all
minor exports and a dominant share of manufactured exports.
The import content (which includes machinery as well as raw materials)
of these exports is substantial, and exceeds the average import content of all
Colombian industry, estimated at about 13 per cent.6 The alert reader will
have noted that the joint impact of the CAT plus the Vallejo Plan can have not
only a significant incentive effect, far exceeding the sum of the impacts of each
scheme in isolation, but also one biased in favor of import-intensive exports.
Take a simple example of a product with an import content of 40 per cent. The
effective protection for exports of that product, excluding transaction costs
involved in using the Vallejo Plan are:
Assumed world sales price $100
Plus effective CAT (about 18 per cent) 118
Minus world purchases ($40); equals value added at
domestic prices 78
Value added at world prices 60
Effective protection 30 per centPOLICY VARIABLES INFLUENCING MINOR EXPORTS 59
Thiseffective protection of 30 per cent may be compared with that which
would result if neither the CAT nor the Vallejo Plan existed and if the average
domestic price for imported inputs were raised by import restrictions to 30 per
cent above the world market price. In that case, effective protection would be
minus 20 per cent, or a swing of fifty percentage points. Clearly, activities
with lower import components will receive lower effective protection for their
exports and their swing will be less, ceteris paribus.
Whether the effective protection applicable to manufactured exports is
higher or lower than the rates that can be calculated for the share of the output
sold in the domestic market will depend on the corresponding domestic prices
for output and inputs (both reflecting import restrictions without exemptions).
Table 2-12 contains some (partial) estimates of the differential incentives
given for a sample of 105 manufactured products, depending on whether they
were sold in Colombia or were exported and on whether the several export
incentive schemes are taken into account. On the import side, however, only
tariffs are included, on the assumption that they equal the difference between
domestic and foreign prices. This is, of course, not true for many products,
either because the tariff contains "water" or because of import controls. So
the table serves primarily to illustrate (very rough) orders of magnitude for the
differences among columns for the same product, rather than differences in
treatment among products in the same column. In the third column, account is
taken of the effective CAT and the Vallejo Plan.
It may be seen that while the export promotion schemes did not equalize
the tariff-intended effective protection between exports and domestic sales,
they narrowed the gap relative to a situation without export promotion
s) schemes. Indeed, in the sample of 105 products, there were 18 for which the
ill figures in the third column were higher than those in the first. The data in the
ill table again show that the combined effect of a CAT based on sales value plus
exemption of duties on imported inputs was quite powerful, in many cases
clearly offsetting the negative effect of overvaluation on the peso prices of
exports relative to nontradable goods, even when the former prices remain
unfavorable compared with those of import-competing goods.7
Although the combined effect of the CAT plus the Vallejo Plan did
discriminate among activities, the spread of the figures in the third column is
smaller than that of the first. This indicates that variations in tariffs on outputs
(or on finished products) were greater than those on inputs.
LAFTA and the Andean Group.
Depending on one's viewpoint, these associations can be regarded as part
of the Colombian export-promotion package or as extensions of import-60 MINOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
TABLE 2-12
Effective Protection Yielded by Tariffls and Export Promotion Schemes, About 1970,
for 105 Products
(per cent; figures in parentheses show number of products included in each category)
For Export
Without With
For Sale Promotion Promotion
inColombia Schemes Schemes
Foodstuffs, tobacco, and
beverages (8) 198 —91 43
Textiles (5) 267 43
Clothing (7) 387 —52 40
Wood and wood products (6) 120 —71 38
Paper and paper products (7) 133 —67 47
Printing and publishing (3) 79 —7 27
Leather and leather products (6) 203 — 149 58
Rubber and rubber products (2) 59 —36 47
Chemicals and petrochemicals
(14) 49 —27 37
Stone, earth, and clay products
(7) 97 —9 25
Metals and metal products (19) 101 —39 40
Nonelectrical tools and
machinery (6) 33 — 17 27
Electrical products and
machinery (4) 57 —52 52
Transport equipment (6) 59 —30 38
Others (5) 149 —48 42
Total (105) 130 —48 39
SOURCE: Data summarized from unpublished calculations of Gonzalo Giraldo. Planning
Department, Colombia. The sample of 105 manufactured products was selected as representative
of actual or potential exports within the Andean Common Market, of which Colombia is a
member. In the calculation of effective protection, only tariffs and export promotion schemes
were taken into account (see text). Input coefficients actually observed in Colombia were used;
imports of capital goods were excluded. An effective CAT of 20 per cent was assumed, a figure
which may be regarded as somewhat high for 1970. Special regimes exempting some imports
from duties were disregarded for this calculation.
substitution efforts. It is not yet clear whether trade creation or trade diversion
will predominate in the Colombian dealings with these preferential trade
associations, but exports to LAFTA appear to differ, on balance, from those to
the rest of the world.
For exports to LAFTA, the incentive effects of the CAT plus the VallejoPOLICY VARIABLES INFLUENCING MINOR EXPORTS 61
Plan can reach high levels, in some cases possibly detrimental to the Colom-
bian economy. This can be shown by going back to the simple example
presented earlier. Suppose, in addition to the assumptions already made, that
some Colombian exports are sold to LAFTA countries at prices 50 per cent
above world prices. The calculation of effective protection inclusive of
LAFTA margins would now be as follows:
Assumed LAFTA price $150
Plus effective CAT (18 per cent) 177
Minus world purchases; equals value added at
Colombian prices 137
Value added at world prices 60
Effective protection on exports to LAFTA 128 per cent
In other words, if LAFTA protective margins are similar to those Colom-
bia applies vis-à-vis the rest of the (non-LAFTA) world, Colombian producers
may actually prefer to sell to LAFTA rather than to the domestic market, as
the CAT-Vallejo Plan benefits could easily outweigh transport costs.
It should be emphasized at this point that not all Vallejo Plan exports go
to LAFTA (and that not all Vallejo Plan exports involve manufactured goods).
From 1967 through 1969, in fact, only 23 per cent of Vallejo Plan exports went
to LAFTA, amounting to less than 8 per cent of all registered minor exports.
Manufactured exports to LAFTA are sometimes sold under conditions of
dumping, bringing their export prices closer to those prevailing in nonprefer-
ential world markets; the benefits to Colombia of this kind of sale, however,
are not always clear.
PROEXPO.
Law 444of1967 created other export-promotion schemes, centered
e around a fund (PROEXPO) generously financed by aper cent tax on the
a c.i.f.value of all imports. The law (articles 181—202) gave that fund broad
s powersand great flexibility to engage in export promotion. PROEXPO pro-
vides local producers with information on foreign markets and technical
advice on transport, packing, quality control, etc., as well as on the produc-
tion of exportable goods. In a country where "shortage of working capital" is
a permanent entrepreneurial complaint, it channels credit under liberal terms
to exporting firms; and under special circumstances it can provide equity
capital. It also insures against political and other noncommercial export risks,
) and has helped to prepare a four-year export plan. By means of imaginative
domestic advertising, including billboards proclaiming that "Exporting is the
best business in Colombia," ittries to develop an "export mentality."862 MINOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
Abroad, PROEXPO also advertises and holds fairs, even sending a Navy ship
with Colombian goods around the Caribbean. During 1970, its credit activities
amounted to 409 million Colombian pesos plus 6.8 million U.S. dollars.
It is difficult to measure the effect of something like PROEXPO on
nontraditional Colombian exports. Some of its activities, in particular its
credit operations, are enthusiastically praised by entrepreneurs otherwise
starved for cheap working capital. Others, such as its advertising and fairs,
have a less clear net value and can easily degenerate into boondoggles. Even
less clear and less readily quantified is the value of such an institution in
affecting private expectations regarding the firmness of a government's com-
mitment to support export activities.
The PROEXPO credit program is one example of how Colombian
ities have used domestic distortions to give greater leverage to export-promot-
ing schemes; if Colombian capital markets were perfect, there would be little
power in that program. Similarly, the potency of the Vallejo Plan would
disappear if all import restrictions were eliminated. Note
that these measures do not always serve simply to offset the harmful effects of
other policies on exporting; for some firms they may offer a net gain relative to
an idealized pure neoclassical situation.
Other Export-Promotion Policy Instruments.
Especially since 1967, the many instruments of the Colombian govern-
ment have been increasingly tilted in favor of exporters of products other than
coffee or oil. Credit, besides that from PROEXPO or aimed at specific
exportable crops, is channeled preferentially, under the more or less explicit
tutelage of central-bank authorities, toward exporters. That preference affects
not only short-term but also long-term credit provided by several special
development funds. The encouragement given to exporters has also stimu-
lated the granting of foreign credit to them. Entrepreneurs are notified both
formally and informally that the fate of their requests regarding import li-
censes, release from price controls, or of any other request having to do with
any field where public-sector action is important—and there are few where that
action is not—will very much depend on their export record. The medals and
banners regularly presented by the Colombian President to distinguished
exporters, in other words, are not simply moral incentives, for they give
recipients some muscle when dealing with the numerous public agencies
capable of making the life of businessmen either easy or miserable and
profitable or unprofitable.
Finally, there are other export-promoting ideas that are just beginning to
be exploited in Colombia to an important degree. One is the creation of areas
in the country equipped with adequate export and overhead facilities to whichTHE SUPPLY RESPONSE OF COLOMBIAN MINOR EXPORTS 63
importscan be brought free of duties and import restrictions, to be used
exclusively by exporting firms located there. In 1973 there were two such free
zones (zonas francas): one in Barranquila, intended to compete with similar
facilities located in Panama, and a more recently built one near Cali (Palma-
seca). Others are being considered. Trading houses, particularly useful for
marketing exports from small- and medium-scale producers, were rare until a
few years ago, but recently several private ones have sprung up. Some
international companies, such as Volkswagen, have set up separate organiza-
tions to promote exports, not all related to their usual line of business.
THE SUPPLY RESPONSE OF COLOMBIAN MINOR
EXPORTS
The export promotion package just described appears to have succeeded in
• generating a rising dollar value of Colombian minor exports, particularly since
1967. Part of that upward trend may be due to increases in export dollar
f prices, which, however, to judge from the scanty data available, do not seem
to have reached large and sustained proportions until 1972—74. On the whole
and for the period under study, it is reasonable to suppose that the observed
time series for the value of minor exports trace out mainly quantity move-
ments along, or shifts in, the Colombian supply curve for exports. While world
demand for these exports fluctuated about a reasonably steady average price
throughout the period under study, there were undoubtedly few products for
which world demand in any one year was not close to being perfectly price
elastic in the range relevant for Colombia. Nevertheless, in spite of these
convenient generalizations, serious problems remain in the estimation of the
supply schedule for minor exports.
There are, first of all, the difficulties arising from the heterogeneity of
• these exports and the lack of quantity indices. It has also been noted that in
some years several commodities received special, sui generis treatment, such
• as bananas, gold, and emeralds. Another set of problems arises from the
proliferation of export-promotion policies adopted by Colombia, many diffi-
cult to quantify, and from their collinearity.
Related problems arise in the handling of trends during the 1960s and
• early 1970s which are said to have encouraged the growth of minor exports,
such as the rapid growth of world trade and, more relevantly, the creation of
LAFTA and the Andean group. Access to a preferential trading arrangement
• makes it possible for a participating country to sell exports to its partners at
prices higher than those in the world market. In exchange, of course, it must
buy their exports at higher-than-world-market prices. As a result, assessment
of the LAFITA and Andean arrangements also is hindered by the previously
mentioned lack of quantity indices for most minor exports.
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Disaggregation by product and customer might seem to provide a partial
answer to these complications. However, it also introduces other problems.
Any subcategory of Colombian minor exports is likely to be quite thin during
most of the period under study, and thus subject to apparently erratic behavior
as a result of particular events, independent of general policy variables.
Temporary excess capacity in three or four important plants, for example,
could give manufactured exports a boost, while a poor crop could send the
quantity of some exports way down.
Whatever the exchange rate and export incentives may be, it can nor-
mally be expected that as a country's productive capacity expands, its supply
curve for exports will steadily shift to the right. There is thus a case, not based
on the expansion of world demand, for including a trend term in regressions
intended to explain export supply response. But this procedure, although it
yields high R2s, often results in ambiguous coefficients, because of the strong
upward trend of minor exports and of key policy variables such as the
effective exchange rate.
The model implicit in supply-response calculations to be shown below,
i.e., a perfectly elastic world demand interacting with a supply of exports
which in turn reflects the difference between the domestic suppiy of and
demand for exportable goods, involves some conceptualization strain when
applied to commodities such as sugar, meat, and cotton. These goods and
others are subject among othef things to domestic regulations of various sorts
(including occasional export quotas). As a result, the quantities of these
commodities available for export are determined by other factors in addition
to their price and their domestic elasticities of demand and supply.
Because of problems of collinearity and serial correlation,9 it was decided
to estimate supply-response equations, focusing on (a) independent variables
mainly related to the effective purchasing-power-parity exchange rate, to see
how far it was possible to carry the analysis with just these variables and (b)
annual percentage changes of the relevant variables. The impact of changes in
the own dollar price of exportables and the influence of several export-
promotion programs discussed above were left out. On the other hand, a
variable related to exchange-rate instability, usually excluded from supply-
response analyses, was introduced, and some exploration of the complicated
dynamic path of supply response was carried out.
Regression Results.
The most up-to-date and best results of the approach outlined above are
presented in tables 2-13 and 2-14. In the following discussion, I will first
highlight the results most favorable to the hypothesis that "the exchange rate
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a66 MINOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
sis, including those not shown in the tables, as well as of other remaining
problems of interpretation.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXCHANGE RATE
In the regressions based on annual data (Table 2-13), the dependent
variables shown include the year-to-year percentage changes in the dollar
value of all minor exports and in the value of BCST and non-BCST exports.
Because of differences in the availability of data, the regressions cover 1955—
72 for all minor exports and 1955—70 for BCST and non-BCST exports. The
independent variables are the year-to-year changes in the effective purchas-
ing-power-parity exchange rate for minor exports; the index of instability of
the rate; and the lagged year-to-year percentage change in the domestic output
of BCST crops. The simple average values for these variables stated in terms
of annual percentage changes, except for the instability index, are as follows:
Recorded minor exports (1955—72): 12.7
BCST exports (1955—70): 14.4
Non-BCST minor exports (1955—70): 13.3
Effective exchange rate (1955—72): 3.7
Instability index (1955—72): 5.5
Domestic BCST output, lagged (1955—72): 6.2
The first three regressions in Table 2-13 show clearly significant coeffi-
cients for changes in the effective exchange rate, implying supply elasticities
between 0.81 and 1.13. These results are similar to those obtained by other
researchers (see footnote 1 in this chapter). Two of the equations also indicate
clearly that exchange instability is quite harmful to the expansion of minor
exports, thus supporting a widespread hunch. In the first regression, for
example, the coefficient for instability tells us that a reduction of the average
quarterly fluctuation in the effective exchange rate from, say, 6.0 to 4.0 will,
ceteris paribus, raise the growth trend of minor exports by 3.7 percentage
points. The same equation tells us that to achieve a similar result by just
changing the effective exchange rate, it would be necessary to carry out a net
effective devaluation of 4.6 per cent every year.
The links between export growth, the exchange rate, and its instability
literally implied by regression 1, and others, may be clarified by the following
example. Suppose the effective exchange rate has been held steady at 10
pesos per U.S. dollar, but that it is then decided to carry it to an average of 11
•pesos in "Year Two" and to 12 pesos in "Year Three," after which it will
again be held steady. The transition takes place entirely in Year Two, when
for each of its quarters the exchange rate can be taken as 10.0, 10.6, 11.4 and
12.0 pesos, respectively. Thus, for that year the instability index will average
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4.7per cent, while for all others it will be zero. Under these circumstances,
growth rate in minor exports predicted by regression 1 will be: Year One, 19.9
per cent; Year Two, 19.3 per cent; Year Three, 28.0 per cent; and Year Four,
19.9 per cent.
t In other words, during Year Two the positive effect of the net devaluation
will be more than offset by the negative instability effect; in Year Three there
will be no instability to drag down the positive effects of the net devaluation,
- butby Year Four growth will be back to a long-term trend unaffected by the
exchange rate. This is surely but a crude attempt to capture the dynamics of
- responseto net devaluation, but for Colombia it does reflect an important
-f experience, even if it leaves out such matters as thresholds, expectations, and
t considerations of the exchange-rate level.
Fluctuations in the domestic output of BCST crops (in the short run
caused to a large extent by weather), entered with a one-year lag in the
I regressionsof Table 2-13, clearly influence changes in BCST exports, and this
• with an elasticity near 2.0. Such a value is compatible with the priority given
by authorities to the domestic consumption of these commodities and the
marginal role assigned to exports.
Although the R2s in Table 2-13 are not as large as those in regressions
• using untransformed variables coupled with time trends, serial correlation and
collinearity problems plaguing those other versions of supply response seem
to have been avoided in my case.
- Theresult that "the exchange rate matters," obtained from annual data,
is confirmed by Table 2-14, showing regressions based on quarterly data, but
in which, as before, the variables include annual percentage changes in all
minor exports and in the effective exchange rate. It has not been possible to
disaggregate quarterly minor exports. For exports and the exchange rate,
therefore, the percentage change between this year's first quarter and last
year's first quarter, and so on, were used. This approach avoids seasonality
considerations. The index of instability is defined as before: for a given
quarterly observation the index refers to the average fluctuation in the
exchange rate during that quarter and the previous three quarters. The
average values for 19551 through 19721V for the variables used in Table 2-14
are 19.5 for recorded minor exports, 4.3 for the effective exchange rate, and
/ 5.6 forthe instability index.
The standard deviations of these annual changes based on quarterly data
•) are of course higher than those derived from annual data. For example, the
• standard deviation of the average percentage change in minor exports is 42.1
I using quarterly data and only 19.5 using annual data. Extreme values, caused
by exogenous circumstances, affect averages of quarterly data much more
•I than those for annual data.
• The supply elasticities estimated in Table 2-14 are close to those obtained
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Regressions for Changes in Minor Exports, Based on Quarterly Data for
1955—72
(t ratios in parentheses)
Dependent Variable:




Independent Variables 19721V 19631V 19721V
Constant 23.32 33.76 19.95
(3.28) (2.72) (2.10)
Changes in the 0.95 0.68 1.04
exchange rate (3.59) (2.02) (2.07)
Instability of exchange —1.42 —2.92 —0.10
rate (1.51) (2.11) (0.06)
R2 0.19 0.31 0.13
F statistic 7.98 7.51 2.37
DW 1.60 1.19 1.96
No. of observations 72 36 36

















in annual regressions and are all significant. The instability index again
performs reasonably well, although better for the earlier years. Identical
regressions covering 19541 through 197111 give even better results for R2 and
t. After 1968, the independent variables show little movement, while export
data, particularly the quarterly figures, maintain considerable variability
(some of which looks spurious).
Tests were made of the hypothesis that the change in minor exports
depends not only on changes in the exchange rate and its instability but also on
the level of the exchange rate; the results were insignificant in all cases.
Another experiment involved using the percentage change in the exchange
rate squared, but keeping its original sign,' to examine the proposition that
large changes in the effective exchange rate cannot be expected to yield
correspondingly large changes in minor exports, either because of adjustment
lags or for other reasons. Most coefficients in this experiment were insignifi-
cant. The best regression covered 19631 through 197111; as expected, this
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(with a t ratio of 2.8), and resulted in a negative sign for the squared term,
which had a coefficient of —0.017 and a t ratio of 1.6. R2 and the Durbin-
Watson statistic rose (slightly) to 0.31 and 1.50, respectively; and the stability
coefficient remained insignificant. The 1963—7 1 regression can be interpreted
as yielding an upper estimate for the supply elasticity of minor exports with
respect to the exchange rate. Finally, a dummy variable was also introduced in
regressions of the type presented in Table 2-14, having a value of 1 whenever
-theexchange rate change was negative, and zero otherwise. This test of
possible asymmetric responses to positive and negative exchange-rate move-
ments yielded no evidence for asymmetry.
Direct experimentation with lagged values for exchange rates, still using
quarterly data, yielded clearly positive results in only one case. For the period
19541—19621V, the coefficient for changes in the exchange rate lagged one full
year was 0.78, with a tstatistic of 3.0. The coefficient of the unlagged
exchange-rate change increased to 0.99, with a tstatistic of 3.9. For the
instability index the coefficient was —4.01 and the t statistic was 4.2. R2 rose
to 0.57, and the Durbin-Watson statistic, to 1.50. Note that the sum of the two
exchange-rate coefficients gives a long-term elasticity practically identical to
that obtained for 1963—71 when the squared exchange-rate change was
included in that regression.'°
IMPORTANCE OF OTHER POLICIES
The evidence discussed so far is consistent with the hypothesis that
exchange-rate policy, including its stability, considerably influenced minor
exports. It does not, however, support the presumption that itis the only
policy which has mattered. Note how in all but one of the regressions in tables
tin 2-13 and 2-14 the constant terms are large and significant. The results of
:al regression1in Table 2-13, for example, indicate that a perfectly stable
nd effective purchasing-power-parity exchange rate for minor exports, at a level
similar to that observed during the period under study, would be consistent
ty with a growth in those exports of about 20 per cent per year, far exceeding
growth in the rest of the Colombian economy. With the instability observed,
its on the average, from 1955 through 1972, the upward trend would still be about
Dfl 10 per cent per year. An upward creep of 3.7 per cent per year in the real
:s. effective exchange rate, always according to the same regression, brings the
•ge rate of expansion in minor exports to about the 13 per cent actually observed.
tat Note that given the annual averages for 1955—72, a supply elasticity of about
3.4, or more," would be needed for the changes in the effective exchange rate
nt alone to explain all of the increase in minor exports.
fl- What lies behind the powerful constant terms? First of all, they could be
us picking up inflationary trends in the world economy, but this cannot account
71 for very much and would be limited to non-BCST exports (BCST dollar prices70 MINOR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
have declined on average during 1957—70). The major answer must rely on
other direct and indirect export-promotion schemes discussed earlier. Note
how the constant term drops in regressions 2 and 3 in Table 2-13 when the
lagged change in domestic production of BCST is brought in; these latter
changes, as discussed earlier, have been heavily influenced in the long run by
credit and other promotional policies of the public sector (and in the short run,
of course, by weather).
Unfortunately, the evidence regarding the influence of exchange-rate
policy on minor exports is less robust than it appears at first sight. Even in
tables 2-13 and 2-14 disaggregation into BCST and non-BCST exports and the
use of subperiods decrease the z statistics for some coefficients. Non-BCST
minor exports, for example, appear less sensitive to exchange-rate changes,
but more sensitive to instability, than BCST exports. It is not obvious why this
should be so, a priori. Furthermore, regressions in which the BCST export
quantity index (presented earlier in this chapter) was used as the dependent
variable yielded insignificant coefficients for exchange-rate variables. Other
regressions (not shown) in which the dependent variables (1958—69 only) were
changes in dollar values of non-BCST exports to LAFTA and non-LAFTA
countries separately, as well as changes in manufactured exports only, yielded
insignificant coefficients for all variables except the constant terms.
Other independent variables, for which yearly data were used, also
yielded insignificant coefficients. These included changes in domestic indus-
trial output (to test for the influence of generalized cyclical excess capacity on
non-BCST and manufactured exports);'2 concurrent (i.e., unlagged) changes
in the domestic production of BCST; and all lagged variables except BCST
output.
4 Aggregating unregistered with registered minor exports and using annual
changes in their combined total as the dependent variable also worsens the
results, and yields insignificant coefficients for the independent variables.
Together with the insignificant results obtained with most lagged variables,
this failure generates some suspicion that at least part of the apparent
exchange-rate elasticity of registered minor exports may arise from substitu-
tion effects induced by the contrast of the legal exchange rate with the black-
market rate, between smuggling and registration, and between one year and
another or one quarter and another, according to John Sheahan's results.
Especially before 1967, for example, the timing of exports of storable BCST
crops could have been influenced by the exchange rate without that implying
much for the long-run expansion of those exports.
It can be argued with some force that the exchange rate used in the
regressions is more applicable to some minor exports than others. It is not just
a matter of neglecting ad hoc exchange regulations for some products; it is also
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)fl the U.S. wholesale price index, butofprice levels and exchange rates in Latin
te American countries as well. Nevertheless, it remains disturbing that the
he disaggregated results are so much poorer than those for all registered minor
er exports lumped together.
What to make of this bundle of results? In spite of the shortcomings
n, noted, the hypothesis that exchange-rate policy has been a major influence on
-theevolution of Colombian minor exports has more evidence to back it up
.te than its extreme opposite. But itis not possible, given the information
in available, to credit different policy variables with exact shares of the increase
1ne in those exports. The untangling of the impact of diff.erent policies on export
promotion may only be possible, in fact, using cross-sectional data for several
•S, countries. Even then, important interaction effects among export-promotion
policies in a given country as well as the degree of credibility of these policies
•irt among entrepreneurs may be impossible to quantify. For example, by how
flt much does commitment to a crawling peg enhance the credibility of export
er incentives? Are there discontinuities (or floors and ceilings) for the effects of
re some variables, depending on the value of others? Will PROEXPO efforts be
A apparent only if the real net exchange rate is above a certain minimum? And
will further increases above that minimum bring fewer additional exports than,
say, expanding the benefits of the Vallejo Plan? Will subsidies to selected
industries generate foreign exchange at lower domestic resource costs than a
S more devalued exchange rate? Or avoid generating quasi rents? Alas, neither a
priori reasoning nor empirical work appears capable at this point of yielding
convincing answers to these questions, at least for Colombia, whose experi-
T ence with substantial minor exports is, after all, relatively short. Throughout
economic history many export booms have shown Schumpeterian patterns
difficult to explain fully using solely concepts such as the price elasticity of
export supply. The Colombian minor export boom, particularly after 1967,
S. falls into that category.
I,
LAFTA VS. NON-LAFTA MINOR EXPORTS: SOME
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
It was seen earlier that one of the most dynamic components of Colombian
minor exports was that destined to LAFFA countries, including the Andean
group. On the face of it, preferential tariff treatment abroad must be combined
with domestic promotion policies to explain the above-average growth rate of
exports to LAFTA. Itis of some interest to explore whether there are
systematic differences between the economic characteristics of LAFTA and
• non-LAFTAexports.
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would be expected between Colombian exports to the rest of Latin America
and those shipped to, say, the United States and the European Common
Market. Whatever the positive theory of trade adopted, whether Heckscher-
Ohlin, Linder, product cycle, or almost any other, differences between the
predicted commodity composition of those trade flows will emerge. But a first
task is to see whether, in fact, the difference is significant.
LAF.FA Share and Capital-Labor Ratios.
It was suggested earlier in this chapter that the more capital-intensive a
given export item of Colombian manufacture is, the larger will be the LAFTA
share in its geographical destination. Colombian capital-labor ratios are not
SOURCE: See text.The means forthe LAFTA shares were as follows:
1968
All export items
Export items over $100,000
1969
All export items
Export items over $100,000
1970
Al! export items
Export items over $100000
TABLE 2-15
Regressions Explaining LAFFA Share of Three-Digit SITC Minor Export Items asa
Function of the Capital-Labor Ratio
(t statisticsin parentheses)
Logarithm of
Capital-Labor F No. of
Constant Ratio R2StatisticObservations
1968
All export items —48.47 9.81
(2.43)
0.06 5.90 100




All export items —96.39 15.22
(3.68)
0.12 13.53 104




All export items —96.27 15.89
(3.80)
0.13 14.43 97
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available to test this proposition in the necessary detail, so the test can be
carried out only if it is assumed that the ranking of activities according to
fl capital-labor ratios is the same in Colombia as in the United States. Further-
more, the test will only refer to direct capital-labor ratios.
Using 1965 capital-labor ratios computed by Gary C. Huthauer for the
S United States'3 and LAFTA shares in matching three-digit SITC Colombian
• exports, primarily of manufactured goods, for 1968, 1969, and 1970, the results
presented in Table 2-15 are obtained. While capital intensity is only one of the
• many variables determining whether a given item is exported to LAFTA or
a elsewhere, the strong t ratios confirm that there is a significant link between
A LAFTA shares and capital intensity. It is noteworthy that in Table 2-15 the
more recent the year, the stronger is the result.
LAFTA Share and Import Intensity.
Using unpublished data from PlaneaciOn, Larry Senger has tried to
explain the share of minor export items going to LAFTA, covering both
manufactured and nonmanufactured goods, as a function of imports per
worker and value added per worker in the sectors generating those exports.
Only the direct import, value-added, and labor requirements of the sector
were considered. For every year from 1961 through 1968, the coefficient for
the logarithm of imports per worker is positive and highly significant, with t
statistics between 4.5 and 8.8. Contrary to my earlier results, the coefficients
for the logarithm of value added per worker are negative, but with erratic t
statistics depending on the year; for 1965, for example, the t statistic is —1.3,
but for 1968 it is —2.1. The R2s range from 0.16 to 0.32, with the number of
observations ranging from 104 to
Interpretation of the Results.
The evidence indicating that Colombian minor exports to LAFTA are
more capital- or import-intensive than those shipped elsewhere isfairly
strong. But the difference in capital intensity could be expected even without
the existence of preferential trading arrangements, at least following some
trade theories, as the Colombian factor endowment is closer to that of the rest
of Latin America than to those of North America and Europe, where most of
her non-LAFTA exports go.
Comparing the unit values for LAFTA exports with those for non-
LAFTA exports for three-digit SITC minor exports, one obtains the expected
result that the former are higher than the latter, on average, for 1968 and 1970.
However, the standard deviation is very high, casting doubt on the signifi-
cance of these averages. The ratio of LAFTA unit values to rion-LAFTA ones
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for 1968 is 1.87, with a standard deviation of 3.56, and is for 100 SITC three-
digititems. The comparable figures for 1970 are 1.33 and 1.16, for 112 items.
When the ratios of LAFTA to non-LAFTA unit values are correlated
with the Hufbauer capital-labor ratios used above, very poor results are
obtained for every year, whether all items are used or only those values above
$100,000. One cannot, therefore, establish a link between high capital-labor
ratios and trade diversion by this route. No firm link appears either between
the ratios of LAFTA to non-LAFTA unit values and the LAFTA share for
each export item.
While the basic explanation of the higher capital intensity of exports to
LAFTA remains moot, their higher import intensity would not be expected on
a priori grounds, and the most plausible explanation for it rests on the
powerful combination of incentives formed by LAFTA preferential margins,
the CAT, and the Vallejo Plan.
LAFTA and the Andean group, particularly the latter, seek broad objec-
tives which may even justify some sacrifices in economic efficiency narrowly
defined. These preferential arrangements provide Colombia, inter alia, with at
least some insurance against a sudden collapse in world trade, such as that of
the l930s. Nevertheless, possible efficiency costs in this area should be
monitored and minimized by close examination of the nature of LAFTA trade
and by a re-examination of export-promotion schemes.
OUTLOOK FOR MINOR EXPORTS
Whatever its defects, the policy package put together in March 1967 has been
consistent with an acceleration in the growth of minor exports. The effects of
the greater stability and the higher level of the effective exchange rate, as well
as other export-promoting features of Law 444, appear to be still filtering
through the economy, strengthening the new "export mentality" and trigger-
ing fresh learning effects, as the timid imitate those already successful in
exporting. If these policies are maintained, including the upward creep in the
effective exchange rate, and if the world economy does not suffer a dramatic
change in trend, a growth rate in minor exports averaging about 15 per cent
can be expected during the next ten years in spite of the expanding base. The
diversified list of minor exports should continue to expand; mining projects for
nickel, gas, and coal may provide important new entries. It may be added, on
the optimistic side, that we have only discussed merchandise exports; Colom-
bia has hardly begun to explore her potential in the export of services, of which
tourism is an obvious example. Service exports, it may be noted, do not
receive CATs.
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strengtheningof a lobby favoring the continuation of export-promotion poli-
cies, still not as potent as the lobbies of coffee growers and import-competing
industries, but growing in distinctiveness and power. That lobby also puts
pressure on public officials to remove barriers to exporting involving social
overhead facilities, such as harbors, and regulated services, such as transport.
r Some may find it strange that no further dismantling of the import control
apparatus has been given as a precondition for future minor export expansion.
r Such dismantling could, of course, serve as an additional impetus, together
with other policy changes, but Colombian experience, as well as that of other
o countries, shows that it is not a sine qua non for export growth. In fact, the
achievement of the 15 per cent target will allow continuation of the gradual
relaxation of import controls, which has been going on since 1967. This
"virtuous circle" of export expansion—import liberalization—more export
growth is the opposite of the vicious circle of export contraction—import
controls—fewer export incentives which dominated many Latin American
economies for about thirty years after the crisis of 1929. In the triggering of
the virtuous circle, export expansion, and not import liberalization, is given
pride of place; launching a massive import liberalization program without a
secure export front can lead to serious setbacks for the whole liberalization
effort, as the 1965—66 Colombian experience shows. Indeed, in retrospect
such experiments, putting the cart before the horse, appear as risky "chicken
games" designed to force the hand of those policymakers reluctant to devalue.
The events of November 1966 showed the limitations of that tactic.
Nor is the creation of firms that are wholly devoted to exporting a
necessary condition for rapid export growth; a gradual increase in the
exported share of many firms from 5to10 per cent and then to 20 per cent can
4
giveimpressive boosts to exchange earnings, and even a constantly rotating
group of sporadic exporters can achieve meaningful results.
The last chapter contains detailed speculation on the probable role of
minor exports in furthering Colombia's development. Here it will be sufficient
to observe that since the long-term prospects for coffee exports as well as for
concessional capital inflows are mediocre, the availability of machinery and
equipment required for achieving an average growth rate of between 6 and 7
per cent per year during the next ten years will very much depend on
achieving a growth in minor exports of about 15 per cent per year to buyers
who are either efficient suppliers of capital goods or of freely convertible
foreign exchange. Colombian prospects for placing her debt in world capital
markets at commercial terms also depend on the outlook for her current-
account earnings.
Under a relaxed balance-of-payments position, continuing expansionary
fiscal and monetary policies could be instituted. The result would be to
mobilize domestic productive resources which in the past too often remained
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idle or underutilized because of stop-go macroeconomic management induced a
by balance-of-payments crises, even when the domestic activities thus penal-
ized were not heavy users of foreign exchange. r
What will this scenario imply for the problem of underemployment and e
the related issue of a skewed income distribution? The achievement of annual h
growth rates of 15 per cent for minor exports and 7 per cent for GDP will not p
automatically result in a lower rate of unemployment or a better income p
distribution in ten years' time. Remember first that the greater availability of h
foreign exchange will allow an expansion of machinery and equipment
imports. How this enlarged flow is spread out and allocated can make the
difference between having more capital-intensive activities, perhaps labor- s
displacing, or having a large number of new labor-absorbing units. Unless
import liberalization and other public policies are formulated that specifically n
avoid giving incentives to the first type of development, faster growth could SI
conceivablylead to more unemployment or underemployment, particularly in d
rural areas. p
Several minor exports, particularly those going to LAFTA, seem to be p
quite capital-intensive, and also frequently import-intensive. Their rapid a
expansion will have little impact on the demand for unskilled labor; indeed,
some purely import-substituting activities and most home goods (nontrad-
ables) are likely to be less capital-intensive. A gradual "fine-tuning" of export
incentive schemes could help correct such a situation by changing the incen-
tive structure without necessarily modifying its average level. Steps in this
direction could include, for example, the imposition of a uniform tariff on
Vallejo Plan imports, compensated for by an increase in the CAT flat rate or in
the upward crawl of the exchange rate. Smaller firms and those whose exports
have a higher domestic value-added content will benefit; both are likely to be I
relatively labor-intensive and involve domestic entrepreneurs to a larger
degree. The spread in the effective protection generated by export incentives
would also be narrowed.'5 The application of these reforms should, of course,
be carried out with extreme care, so that healthy export growth will not be cut I
off in the process of discarding distorted policies. If nothing else, the imperfect
state of knowledge regarding the exact impact on minor exports of each of the
various promotion policies makes such caution very advisable.
Even with refined and improved export-promotion and import-allocation
policies it is unlikely that the twin targets of 15 and 7 per cent growth for minor
exports and GDP will improve Colombian income distribution by very much.
By 1973 minor exports had reached between 5 and 6 per cent of GDP; their
direct and indirect domestic value added was probably between 4 and 5per
cent of GDP. If such value added also grows by 15 per cent per year during the
next ten years, and GDP grows at 7 per cent, by the end of that time direct and ii
indirect value added in minor exporting activities will have reached between 8NOTES 77
and 10 per cent of GDP. So even if all the additional exports were labor-
intensive, their net impact on the aggregate demand for unskilled labor would
remain, at least for the next ten years, modest. Note also that further
expansion of primary-product exports, such as meat, cotton, and sugar, can
hardly be counted upon to improve land tenure conditions. In fact, the need to
promote exports has already been used as an argument against land reform,
particularly in the Cauca Valley and along the Atlantic coast. The relatively
high share of coffee output produced in small- and medium-sized farms is not a
feature duplicated in most new rural exports.
The major contribution of faster export growth and of a foreign trade
sector free of the periodic crises so prevalent before 1967 may very well turn
out to be that it gives policymakers the opportunity, which they may or may
not grasp, to turn their attention away from the basically unnecessary and
superficial balance-of-payments hysterics and toward more important and
difficult problems, such as raising the welfare of the poorest half of the
population within a reasonably short period of time. That task will require
policy measures beyond the manipulation of exchange rates, CATs, tariffs,
and such.
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• Economic Development Reports 75, mimeographed (paper presented at the Harvard Develop-
ment Advisory Service Conference, Sorrento, Italy, September 1967); José Diego Teigeiro and R.
Anthony Elson, "The Export Promotion System and the Growth of Minor Exports in Colombia,"
[MF Staff Papers, July 1973, pp. 419—470; Alberto R. Musalem, "Las Exportaciones Colombi-
anas, 1956—1969," mimeographed (Universidad de los Andes, May 1970); Richard R. Nelson, 1.
Paul Schultz, and Robert L. Slighton, Structural Change in a Developing Economy: Colombia's
• Problems and Prospects (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), especially pp. 210—
213; Jonathan W. Eaton, "Effective Devaluation as an Export Incentive in Less Developed
Countries" (B.A. thesis, Harvard University, March 1972), Chap. 6.
2. Many definitions have been put forth for manufactured exports; the one used here simply
includes SITC categories 3 (except crude petroleum), 5, 6, 7, and 8. This omits synthetic fibers
(SITC 266) while including minerals and ores with little refinement.
3. Data obtained from UNFAO-PY and UNFAO-TY, various issues.
4. Richard C. Porter, "The Birth of a Bill Market," Discussion Paper ii, mimeographed
(Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan. August 1970), has
analyzed in detail the relationships between the marginal tax and discount rates of a given firm and
the extent of the export stimulus offered by CAT and its predecessor subsidy scheme. He shows
that both CAT and the exemption scheme yield larger export incentives to firms with higher
marginal tax rates and lower discount rates (typically larger firms). However, he argues that78 MINORMERCHANDISE EXPORTS
relative to the previous tax exemption, the CAT system increased the export stimulus for firms
with marginal tax rates below37.5per cent and reduced it for firms with higher tax rates.
5. As an illustration,it may be noted that the Colombian PPP-EER for minor exports
computed with respect to the German mark rose by 78 per cent between 1960and1972, while the
equivalent rate with respect to the US. dollar rose by only 46 per cent. Indices for both effective
rates (1960 =100)were as follows:
BasedonBased on Based onBased on
U.S. German U.S. German
Dollar Mark Dollar Mark
1955—59 106 107 1965—69 128 133
1960—64 118 123 1970—72 143 164
6.As noted by my colleague Benjamin I. Cohen, the expansionof import-intensive export
activities may soon call forthe computationof data for net rather than gross exports, at least for
some types of exports, particularly in countries that have gone deeply into export-oriented
assembly-type activities with heavy use of imported parts. Part of the addition in import require-
ments associated with export booms may show up under the service account as trips abroad, and
these are likely to multiply, for such reasons (legitimate or spurious) as attendance at fairs,
contacts with customers, and searches for new outlets.
7.It can be shown that in a locally monopolized industry selling both at home and abroad, but
at different prices, a lowermg of import duties can lead to a contraction of exports and an
expansion of domestic sales. This apparently paradoxical result, however, is unlikely to have
much practical relevance over the long run. The basic argument is developed in an unpublished
paper of Gonzalo Giraldo of the Colombian Planning Department. It is similar to the analysis
showing that the imposition of a minimum wage can expand employment under conditions of labor
monopsony.
8. The advertising is similar to that sponsored sporadically by the Bureau of International
Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce. See, for example, the ad "It took a Texan to cool the
Japanese," Wall Street Journal, January 26, 1972, p. 11.
9. In earlier work, Durbin-Watson statistics in supply-response regressions were very low.
See also Eaton's thesis, mentioned in footnote 1, above.
10. Regressions using untransformed quarterly data, but in logarithmic form and with explicit
trend variables, yielded elasticities near 1.0. When trend terms were excluded the elasticities rose
to about 2.7 for the whole period. The instability index also performed well in these regressions,
and the R2s were, of course, much higher with trend (around 0.85).TheDurbin-Watson statistics,
however, were always below 1.0, often less than 0.5. Dummies indicated the presence of
significant seasonal factors, particularly a positive factor in the second quarter. As in the work of
John Sheahan, referred to in footnote 1, above, the regression coefficients for the lagged exchange
rate were insignificant or had the wrong sign.
11. But in ten years' time the increase in minor exports growing at 12.7 per cent per year will
be 230.6 per cent. The corresponding figure for an exchange rate growing at 3.7 per cent will be
43.8 per cent. Consequently, while for the annual rates the ratio (elasticity) is 3.4, for the ten-year
span it is 5.3.
12.For example, during the difficult yearof 1967 industrial output rose by only 3.6 per cent,
comparedwith an average rise of 5.7per centfor the previous two years. Pure manufactured
exports,however, rose by only 4.8per cent in dollar value during that year, in contrast with an
averagerise of 21.2 per cent during the previous two years. It is possible that more disaggregated
indices of excess capacity would yield better results.
13. See Gary C. Hufbauer, "The Impact of National Characteristics and Technology on the
Commodity Composition of Trade in Manufactured Goods," in Raymond Vernon, ed., TheNOTES 79
TechnologyFactor in International Trade, Universities—National Bureau Conference 22 (New
OS York: NBER, 1970), PP. 145—231, particularly TableA-2.But see also the comments of Jagdish N.
Bhagwati in the same volume, pp. 273—274.
14. See Larry Senger, "General Characteristics, Factor Intensities and Destinations of Minor
he Colombian Exports" (Senior Essay, Yale University, March 1974), Table Villa.
we 15. These andsimilarsuggestions have been put forth and elaborated by the staff of the
Colombian National Planning Department, at least since 1970.
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